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Prior to January 1, 1997, individuals with drug- or alcohol-related
disabilities could qualifij for federal public assistance through the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. During the welfare
reforms of the Clinton administration, this policy was changed,
resulting in lost income and health care benefits for many lowincome substance abusers. This paper examines the historical underpinnings to the elimination of drug addiction and alcoholism
(DA&A) as qualifjing impairments for SSI disability payments.
Following this, empirical evidence is presented on the effect this
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policy change had on the subsequent economic security offormer
SSI DA&A beneficiaries. Findings indicate that study participants who lost SSI benefits suffered increased economic hardship folloving the policy change. These findings have important
implications for future social wvelfare policymaking decisions.
Keywords: Welfare reform, Supplemental Security Income, substance abuse, economic security

The legitimacy of drug addiction and alcoholism as disabling impairments to occupational functioning has been a
point of contention among politicians, physicians, and substance abuse treatment professionals and advocates for some
time. The lack of a clear understanding of substance abuse
coupled with many subjective interpretations of the phenomenon has made defining drug addiction and alcoholism problematic. Ambiguity related to the nature and consequences of drug
addiction and alcoholism has made constructing social welfare
policy and providing public assistance for drug addicts and
alcoholics a difficult proposition. Philosophical and ideological divisions among political constituencies (e.g., politicians,
recovering addicts and alcoholics, and substance abuse treatment professionals) have complicated efforts to address this
issue. In 1974, with the initial implementation of Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), the federal government attempted to
assist low-income substance abusers by categorizing drug
addiction and alcoholism (DA&A) as a disability. Under this
public assistance program, low-income individuals dependent
on drugs or alcohol and unable to work had the opportunity to
claim their condition as a disability. Individuals with substantiated claims were mandated to substance abuse treatment,
to having a representative payee, and to continued disability
reviews in exchange for monthly cash assistance and health
care benefits (i.e., Medicaid) [Social Security Amendments Act,
19721. Unfortunately, due to a variety of administrative and
programmatic problems, as well as a shifting political environment, this attempt by the federal government to assist lowincome substance abusers was relatively short-lived.
In the summer of 1996, Congress passed the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA; PL 104-193), more commonly referred to as
"welfare reform," as the culmination of a campaign by
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politicians to redefine the American welfare system. In March
1996, Congress preceded the PRWORA with passage of the
Contract with America Advancement Act (PL 104-121). It was
in this act, the Contract with America Advancement Act, that
Congress mandated the elimination of drug addiction and
alcoholism as eligibility categories for SSI disability benefits
(Davies, Iams, & Rupp, 2000). When Congress eliminated the
DA&A category, it estimated that 75% of former SSI DA&A
beneficiaries (approximately 125,000 out of 166,666 recipients)
would requalify for SSI benefits under a different disability
category, such as chronic physical or mental illness (Watkins,
Podus, Lombardi, & Burnam, 2001). Unfortunately, only 35% of
beneficiaries were reclassified (Lewin & Westat, 1998). This left
over 110,000 low-income substance abusers without monthly
income or health care benefits.
In this paper, a brief description of the historical, social,
and political antecedents that influenced the elimination of
substance abuse as a disability category is provided (see Hunt,
2000; and Hunt & Baumohl, 2003, for a more thorough description of this topic). Following this, a number of implementation
issues that affected the saliency of the DA&A program are presented. Lastly, empirical evidence on the effects terminating
the DA&A category had on the economic security of former
SSI DA&A beneficiaries is examined.
Policy Change Antecedents
Social and Political Issues
The elimination of drug addiction and alcoholism as a
category for SSI disability eligibility was influenced by a
combination of social and political reactions. Moral interpretations of substance abuse called into question its legitimacy
as a disability. Opponents of the benefit continued to argue
that substance abuse was "self-inflicted," more a characterological deficit than a disease or medical condition. Concerns
related to drug addicts and alcoholics as worthy or deserving
recipients of welfare benefits, and the legitimacy of drug addiction and alcoholism as a disability category, can be seen in
the differential treatment DA&A beneficiaries were subjected
to by policymakers and program administrators. First, DA&A
beneficiaries were the only group receiving public assistance
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that were required to receive treatment or have their benefits
suspended (Gresenz, Watkins, & Podus, 1998). This criterion
did not apply to any other disabled group. Individuals suffering from chronic health or mental health problems were not
required to seek treatment to avoid losing benefits. Second,
DA&A beneficiaries were the only group of public assistance
recipients mandated to have representative payees. While
severely and persistently mentally ill beneficiaries may have
representative payees, mentally ill beneficiaries are not mandated to use a third party (Rosen & Rosenheck, 1999). Finally,
following passage of the Social Security Independence and
Program Improvements Act of 1994 (PL 103-296), SSI benefits
for DA&A recipients were limited to 36 months (Davies, et al.,
2000). This implies, at the very least, that public officials did
not consider drug addiction and alcoholism to be chronic disabilities. This sentiment was reinforced in May 1994 by the SSA
Commissioner when she expressed to Congress that it was the
expectation of DA&A recipients to take full responsibility for
their recoveries and get off of the SSI disability payment rolls
(Departments of Labor, 1994). This statement reflected the personal responsibility rhetoric being propagated by conservative
politicians at that time.
Disapproving politicians and moral entrepreneurs expressed further concern for the DA&A program and its beneficiaries with claims of inappropriate use of cash benefits. Many
felt that DA&A recipients used their benefits to buy drugs and
alcohol (Satel & Glazer, 1993). According to Anderson and
others (2002), many DA&A recipients could be characterized
as "lying, swindling, drug addicts who were squandering taxpayers [sic] money on dope" (p. 266). Senator William Cohen
(R-ME) was quoted in a number of prominent newspapers
criticizing the DA&A program's approach to helping lowincome drug addicts and alcoholics. For example, in a 1994
New York Times article, he stated that "[h]undreds of millions of
scarce Federal dollars" were being used by DA&A recipients
to buy illegal drugs (Cohen, 1994a, p. 15). In the Washington
Post, he stated that DA&A benefits were "often used to perpetuate addictions, rather than cure them, and the addicts
and alcoholics ride along on a drug-laden train fueled by their
continuing disabilities" (Cohen, 1994b, p. 17). Such comments
were indicative of the political dissatisfaction with the DA&A
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program that existed among some elected officials during the
early 1990s. While this position was not universally regarded
by members of Congress, the bipartisan support it did receive
would eventually compromise the political saliency of the
DA&A program.
Disharmony among constituents of the DA&A program
would escalate when it became evident that many substance
abuse treatment and service providers were also dissatisfied
with the program. Television programs broadcast stories with
recovering alcoholics, shelter operators, and substance abuse
treatment administrators and clinicians, all stating how SSI
payments were harming drug addicts and alcoholics, and preventing effective treatment (Goldstein, Anderson, Schyb, &
Swartz, 2000). A story on CBS's 60 Minutes described how the
SSA was providing drug addicts and alcoholics with public
assistance for the explicit use of perpetuating "addictive lifestyles" (p. 217). NBC's Dateline aired a similar segment not
only criticizing DA&A beneficiaries for using public funds to
purchase drugs and alcohol, but demonstrating opposition to
the DA&A program from substance abuse treatment providers and individuals in recovery (Hunt, 2000). These mediated
accounts of DA&A recipients spending their public assistance
benefits on drugs and alcohol, and of members of the substance
abuse treatment community criticizing a program specifically
designed to help drug addicts and alcoholics, provided considerable ammunition for opponents of the DA&A program.
Implementation Issues
The greatest impediment to the successful implementation of the DA&A program was the administration of the substance abuse treatment and representative payee mandates.
According to policy, DA&A beneficiaries were required to participate in a substance abuse treatment program (if appropriate
treatment were available) and receive SSI payments through a
representative payee (Davies, et al., 2000). To administer the
treatment mandate of the program, the SSA developed a plan
to create a system of independent state-contracted referral
and monitoring agencies. These agencies were set up to refer
DA&A beneficiaries to substance abuse treatment services,
as well as to monitor treatment compliance (Watkins, Wells,
& McLellan, 1999). If beneficiaries failed to comply with the
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substance abuse treatment mandate, they would be subject
to progressive sanctions up to, and including, loss of benefits
(SSA, 1995). The trouble with the representative payee mandate
was not whether a beneficiary had a representative payee; this
requirement was handled administratively upon entry into
the program. The problem that developed was more related to
whom the benefit checks were being sent.
Treatment Mandate
One reason implementing the mandated substance abuse
treatment requirement for DA&A recipients was so difficult was that appropriate resources were never provided.
Congress never adequately compensated for the operational
responsibilities that were assumed by the SSA in acquiring a
new service population, nor were funds appropriated to treat
DA&A beneficiaries (Hunt, 2000). By law, the SSA could not
pay for treatment for beneficiaries; it had to rely on Medicaid
and Medicare. Substance abuse treatment, however, was not a
federally mandated Medicaid benefit. Furthermore, Medicaid
coverage varied by state. While some states included some
type of substance abuse treatment in their coverage, others
did not. DA&A beneficiaries that resided in states that did not
cover treatment were relegated to the public treatment system
(e.g., county-funded substance abuse treatment services). This
resulted in substantial barriers to treatment and great inconsistency in treatment provision across states. Beneficiaries in many
rural areas found it difficult to even locate appropriate treatment services. Beneficiaries requiring methadone maintenance
or dual diagnosis treatment services were further limited by a
lack of such services in many areas (Hunt & Baumohl, 2003).
The actual number of DA&A recipients that ever made it to
treatment is unclear. Reports vary, ranging from nine percent
(Government Accounting Office, 1994) to a self-reported 47%
(Office of the Inspector General [OIG], 1994b). The lack of
available and appropriate substance abuse treatment resources
compromised the intent of the original policy mandate.
Because the SSA had to defer the provision of treatment
service requirements to existing public substance abuse treatment programs, the increased bureaucracy made effective implementation of the treatment mandate much more difficult.
In theory, the referral and monitoring agencies (RMAs) were
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to administer the treatment mandate for the SSA. In reality,
for most of the life of the DA&A program, most states did not
have a functional RMA. The first RMAs chosen by the SSA
were state vocational rehabilitation programs. When these
agencies proved ineffective, Congress, as part of President
Reagan's Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, authorized contracts with private rehabilitation programs with the
caveat that no rehabilitation program would be reimbursed for
services until a beneficiary achieved nine continuous months
of employment (Berkowitz, 1987). This mandate, which was
reflective of the Reagan administration's agenda to make the
receipt of public assistance benefits more difficult, thereby reducing federal spending on such programs, discouraged most
agencies from participating in the RMA system. As a result, by
1984, there were only 10 states with RMA contracts (Hunt &
Baumohl, 2003). This created more problems for the SSA due
to the fact that, if no RMA was available, then the regional SSA
office had to perform the task. Since resources were not provided for such an undertaking, many DA&A beneficiaries went
unmonitored. In 1992, the SSA issued a Request for Proposals
with the intention of placing an RMA in all 50 states and the
District of Columbia. Ironically, it would not be until the last
year of the program, after its fate had been determined, that
the SSA would have an RMA in every state (Hunt, 2000).
Representative Payee Mandate
Problems of implementation related to the representative
payee mandate were less related to compliance than to propriety. Representative payees of DA&A beneficiaries were
responsible for managing the recipients' cash benefits so that
funds were spent appropriately (e.g., housing, food, and clothing). Representative payees could be "a nonprofit social service
agency, a governmental social service agency or public guardian, another organization, a family member or other interested
person" approved by the SSA to act in the best interest of the
beneficiary (SSA, 1996, p. 1). However, many representative
payees were neither related, nor organizationally connected,
to the beneficiary (OIG, 1994a). Some, rather, were bartenders,
liquor store owners, and fellow DA&A recipients (Gresenz, et
al., 1998). Political opponents of the DA&A program grasped
on to this information using it to full advantage.
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Another problem related to the representative payee
system had to do with large lump-sum retroactive payments.
Retroactive benefit payments to DA&A beneficiaries were the
result of back funds accumulating during an applicant's claim
or appeal process. As a result, low-income substance abusers
with substantiated disability claims would receive "back pay,"
a disbursement that could range from a few hundred to a few
thousand dollars (Satel, Reuter, Hartley, Rosenheck, & Mintz,
1997). Drug addicts and alcoholics that were able to acquire all
of their retroactive benefit payment from inappropriate or irresponsible representative payees were placed in a very vulnerable position. Surplus cash often translated into prolonged episodes of drug use and the occasional drug overdose. Instances
of misuse of public assistance funds to purchase alcohol and
drugs by DA&A recipients received much attention from the
media and conservative political opponents (Satel, et al., 1997).
In one 1992 case, a heroin addict arrested for possession in
Bakersfield, California, was found to have thousands of dollars
in cash from retroactive SSI payments. A more damaging case,
occurring at the same time and in the same city, concerned a
man found dead from a drug overdose in a motel room following the purchase of a large amount of drugs with retroactive
funds (Hunt, 2000). Such highly publicized, albeit rare, horror
stories proved very damaging to the entire DA&A program.
Program Growth
A major problem affecting the implementation of DA&A
program provisions was the unexpected and unprecedented
growth the program experienced in the early 1990s. In 1990,
there were approximately 24,000 SSI DA&A beneficiaries on
the rolls; by 1996, that number had increased to nearly 170,000
(Gresenz, et al., 1998). This sudden explosion in the number of
program participants compounded already existing SSA staffing, communication, and resource issues. Not only were SSA
employees inexperienced and inadequately trained to deal
with low-income drug addicts and alcoholics, now they were
overwhelmed by the growing magnitude of the problem.
The sudden expansion of the DA&A program can be attributed to a combination of factors. The creation of more
RMAs, the broadened interpretation of substance abuse as a
disabling disorder resulting from a number of federal court
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cases, the shifting of GA recipients to SSI by some states and
counties, and a moratorium on continuing disability reviews
by disability reviewers in the mid 1980s for political reasons
all contributed to the sudden growth of the program (Hunt &
Baumohl, 2003). The placement of RMAs in more states across
the country during the early 1990s increased the number of SSI
applicants determined to have a drug addiction and alcoholism disability. SSA regional staffs were less hesitant about designating DA&A claimants as drug- or alcohol-disabled if they
did not have to deal with the responsibility of referring and
monitoring applicants. Hunt and Baumohl (2003) speculate
that in states without RMAs, "disability-determination teams
were less inclined to approve drug addicts and alcoholics in the
absence of a way to ensure treatment compliance" (p. 28). This
possibility indicates the significance having an RMA played
on the number of applicants determined to have a DA&A disability in a particular region.
During the Reagan and Bush administrations, there were
a number of federal court cases that challenged the government's competence in determining drug addiction and alcoholism disability claims. A 1990 class action suit (Wilkerson v.
Sullivan) brought against the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services asserted that disability claims
based exclusively on severe alcoholism had been mishandled
by the SSA resulting in a high rate of error in determining
DA&A disability cases. The suit claimed "the Secretary had
willfully violated the regulations by never allowing severe alcoholism alone to be a disabling impairment" (Hunt, 2000, pp.
57-58). The federal district court found for the plaintiffs but the
decision was overturned by the 3 d Circuit Court of Appeals
with the advice that the Secretary impart on SSA and DDS
staffs the importance of accurately identifying DA&A claimants (Hunt & Baumohl, 2003). The full impact this court decision had and the resulting pressures it put on Administration
officials is unclear; however, over the following two years the
number of DA&A beneficiaries doubled.
Motivated by the placement of more RMAs and the liberalizing of DA&A disability eligibility interpretations, many
states and counties, along with advocates for low-income substance abusers, saw an opportunity to transfer their most severely affected clients from the state and county welfare rolls
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to the federal government's (Schmidt, 1990). Moving clients
from General Assistance (GA) to SSI was seen as a win-win
proposition by state and county social service agencies. The
state or county would no longer be financially responsible for
the client, and the client would receive increased cash benefits, access to substance abuse treatment, health care coverage,
and a representative payee to help manage the resources of
the drug- or alcohol-disabled beneficiary. A newly burgeoning
"troubled persons" industry also benefited as recovery homes
and therapeutic communities gained access to a steady stream
of federal dollars.
Due to a political controversy created by the Reagan administration's attempt to reduce the number of individuals
collecting disability benefits in the 1980s, for a period of approximately two years the SSA ceased all continuing disability reviews (CDRs) and denials of mental impairment claims
(Berkowitz, 1987). A change in CDR criteria (i.e., the removal
of a "medical improvement" provision requiring beneficiaries to have improved medically before they could be denied
benefits) made termination of disability benefits easier. The
Reagan administration utilized this change in review criteria
to questionably terminate many disabled individuals, a large
number of whom had severe mental impairments. Outraged
disability reviewers refused to conduct CDRs. The resulting
moratorium created a backlog of CDRs. Once the moratorium
was lifted, the SSA was faced with an exorbitant number of
overdue reviews. This created a negative exit to entry ratio that
the Administration had a very difficult time resolving. DA&A
beneficiaries that successfully completed treatment were often
not re-evaluated, and continued to collect disability benefits.
In an 18-month period between 1994 and 1995, RMAs referred
2182 cases to the SSA for a CDR following successful completion of a substance abuse treatment program. Only 32 cases
were terminated (OIG, 1997).
Summary
Many factors contributed to the elimination of the DA&A
program. Socially and politically,the program was an easy target
for conservatives. Throughout the lifetime of the SSI DA&A
program (1972-1996), the federal government was predominantly lead by conservative politicians intent on reducing the
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scope and magnitude of social welfare in this country. During
the Clinton administration, conservative ideology attributing
social ailments such as poverty, unemployment, and substance
abuse to individual factors, and a campaign of welfare reform
predicated on moral themes of personal responsibility, selfsufficiency, and hard work, defined a sociopolitical environment that was not conducive to providing public assistance to
low-income drug addicts and alcoholics. Negative perceptions
of the program provided by media horror stories and a lack
of support from the substance abuse treatment community reinforced the conservative perspective that cash assistance to
drug addicts and alcoholics only promoted and encouraged
substance abuse. The division among political constituencies
became more damaging when it became evident that the SSA
had little enthusiasm to administer the program. The few proponents the program did have were overwhelmed by the opposition. Beneficiaries had no power, and many progressives
did not want to appear "soft" on drugs in an election year.
Besides the social and political factors conspiring against
the DA&A program, problems related to poor implementation
were equally overwhelming. Much of this can be attributed
to a lack of resources in the face of unprecedented program
growth. However, even before the program started to grow so
rapidly in the early 1990s, the SSA failed to effectively manage
the treatment and representative payee mandates. The referral
and monitoring system was severely inadequate. Few beneficiaries ever went to treatment, treatment effectiveness was not
monitored, and continued disability reviews were not always
conducted. Negative attitudes toward the DA&A program and
its beneficiaries among service providers and SSA employees
made implementation that much more difficult. With these
social, political, and programmatic problems contributing to
the instability of the DA&A program, its demise should not be
surprising. The effects eliminating this program had on lowincome substance abusers are important for understanding the
implications of this policy change.

The Impact of Welfare Reform Legislation
The impact of welfare reform legislation on marginalized
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and disadvantaged populations requires special attention by
policy researchers and analysts. Previous research on 1996
welfare reform outcomes has indicated that, while the number
of welfare recipients has significantly declined, the quality of
life of former public assistance (i.e., Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families, Supplemental Security Income) beneficiaries
has not necessarily improved. Many former public assistance
beneficiaries that have been forced to leave the social welfare
system as a result of newly-mandated time limits or reformed
eligibility criteria have reported either sustained or increased
economic and material hardship (Acs & Loprest, 2007; Norris,
Scott, Speiglman, & Green, 2003). Welfare reforms that result in
abrupt changes to established mechanisms of income maintenance and health care security among low-income individuals,
such as the elimination of the SSI DA&A program, are expected to have an even greater effect on what must be considered a
vulnerable population.
In the following study, income levels for a panel of 412
former SSI DA&A beneficiaries from Northern California
were examined following elimination of the SSI DA&A category. Self-reported income data (i.e., amount and source of
income) were gathered at baseline, as well as 6-, 12-, 18-, 24-,
and 42-month follow-up interviews. These interviews began
just prior to the policy change in December, 1996, and were
concluded in November, 2000. Longitudinal income data were
analyzed using mixed model techniques to determine changes
in levels of economic support over time. A primary interest of
the researchers was to compare longitudinal income outcomes
of former SSI DA&A beneficiaries that were able to retain SSI
income benefits under another disability category with those
that lost benefits. The ultimate goal of this research was to determine the effects eliminating formal income maintenance
benefits (i.e., SSI) had on the subsequent economic security of
low-income substance abusers.
Methods
Study Sam ple
The study sample was selected from a population of SSI
DA&A recipients residing in and around the San Francisco
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Bay Area as of December 1996. A sampling frame consisting of
SSI DA&A beneficiaries from four Northern California counties (Alameda, San Francisco, San Joaquin, and Santa Clara)
was developed by Maximus, the referral and monitoring
agency responsible for tracking treatment placement and compliance among SSI DA&A beneficiaries in those areas. From
this sampling frame, 775 individuals were randomly selected.
Ultimately, 519 study participants would meet all inclusion
criteria for the study and complete baseline surveys. At the 42month follow-up, a final panel of 412 study participants was
established. Of the potential 2472 interviews available over the
lifetime of the study from this panel (412 study participants X
6 waves of data), only 30 follow-up interviews were missed.
Dropout analysis of the 107 study participants excluded from
the final panel did not differ significantly, with the exception
of ethnicity. Forty-one percent of the study dropouts were
Caucasian compared to 29% of the study's final panel.
Variables
Income. This study was concerned with two types of income
variables: 1) total income for each study participant at each interview, and 2) primary income source following termination
of the DA&A category. Total income was calculated by adding
all reported income sources in the 30 days prior to an interview. Income sources ranged from legitimate employment to
formal mechanisms of income support (i.e., public assistance
and social insurance) to informal sources, such as monies from
friends and family, panhandling, gambling, prostitution, and
other illegal activities. Primary income source reflected a study
participant's primary source of income over the 3.5 years following the policy change. In order to assess differences in the
economic security of study participants that requalified for SSI
benefits under another disability and study participants that
lost SSI benefits, three primary income groups were constructed. The first primary income group was SSI retainers. These
study participants reported receiving SSI benefits in more
than half of the months leading up to a follow-up interview;
they also needed to be "on SSI" for a majority of their followup interviews. This group accounted for 47% (n = 193) of the
study sample. The second primary income group consisted
of study participants that reported some other type of public
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assistance (i.e., Temporary Assistance for Needy Families or
General Assistance) as their primary source of income following termination of the DA&A category. This comparison group
was characterized as having lost SSI benefits, but still relying
primarily on public assistance. This primary income group accounted for 21% (n = 87; 31 TANF, 56 GA) of the study sample.
The final primary income group, a residual group, was labeled
the "no public assistance" group. These study participants
were characterized as having lost SSI benefits and relying
on informal resources and/or employment as their primary
income source. These individuals accounted for 32% (n = 132)
of the study sample.
Clinical characteristics.Issues related to mental health and
substance abuse were a concern for this population. In order
to assess the impact mental illness and alcohol and drug use
had on study participants' ability to recoup or obtain income,
variables related to these clinical characteristics were included
in the study. The mental health variable was quite liberal-a
dichotomous variable indicating the self-reporting of any
serious mental health symptomatology (e.g., serious depression, serious anxiety, hallucinations, and suicidal ideation) at
each follow-up interview. The indicators for substance abuse
were any illicit drug use or any heavy alcohol use (i.e., five or
more drinks on five or more occasions in the past 30 days for
men, four or more drinks on five or more occasions in the past
30 days for women) at any point following the policy change.
Demnographics. Demographic variables included age (in
years), gender, ethnicity, education, county of residence, employment, and time (in days) since first interview. Ethnicity
was categorized as Caucasian (reference), African American,
Hispanic, and Other; education was dichotomized to indicate high school graduate or equivalent. Dummy variables
were constructed for the four Northern California counties
(Alameda, San Francisco, San Joaquin, and Santa Clara); and
employment was categorized as 1) no employment, 2) worked
20 hours or less per week, and 3) worked more than 20 hours
per week. Variables for the interaction between income determinants (i.e., primary income source and employment) and
clinical characteristics (i.e., any mental health symptom, any
illicit drug use, and heavy alcohol use), and time since first
interview were also constructed.
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StatisticalAnalysis
Multivariate mixed random and fixed effects growth curve
models were used to estimate changes in the total income of
former SSI DA&A beneficiaries following the policy change.
Several models of increasing complexity were estimated to understand the relationship between primary income source, employment, time, and post-policy-change income while controlling for demographic and clinical characteristics of the study
sample. Mixed effects models can be conceptualized as twolevel models. The first level is the individual or person level.
This level models the expected change in income over time for
each study participant. The second level is the population or
group level. It is used to model the expected change in income
over time between study participants. Mixed effects growth
curve models have been shown to effectively estimate longitudinal outcomes (i.e., labor force participation and criminal
behavior) for this population (Orwin, Campbell, Campbell, &
Krupski, 2004). Since this study was interested in modeling
income trajectories following termination of the DA&A category, baseline measures of income taken just prior to the policy
change were adjusted for in most models.
Model 1, the unrestricted mean model, is the simplest model
and estimated the grand mean total income along with level-i
and level-2 random effects. Model 2 included the time variable,
days since the initial interview, both as a fixed effect for the
mean rate of change in total income over time, and a random
effect expressing between-person-level differences in the fixed
effect time slope. The next two models added fixed effects for
baseline income, primary income groups, demographic variables, and clinical characteristics in a stepwise fashion. Model
3 added fixed effect parameters for membership in one of three
primary income groups: retained SSI (reference), other public
assistance, and no public assistance, as well as a control for
baseline income. Model 4 added demographic characteristics,
such as age, gender, ethnicity, county of residence, and education, and fixed effects for clinical characteristics, such as the
presence of any serious mental health symptoms, the use of an
illicit drug, and the heavy use of alcohol. Model 5 added indicators of level of employment: no work (reference), worked 20
hours or less per week, and worked more than 20 hours per
week. Covariates for cross-level interactions between the effect
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of work and time on income were also included. Stata 9.2 was
used for all analyses (StataCorp, 2005).
Like most income data, the distribution of income for this
study sample was positively skewed. Using a log transformation failed to address the distributional problems associated
with skewed data. To address the positively skewed data, we
used a bootstrap approach to empirically estimate the standard
errors for the fixed and random effects. Simulation studies
have demonstrated that bootstrapping effectively reduces the
bias in standard errors associated with skewed income data
and allows the coefficients to be displayed in their original
dollar units (Afifi, Kotlerman, Ettner, & Cowan, 2007; Efron &
Tibshirani, 1993).
Another issue with the self-reported income data was the
presence of outliers. We assumed there were two potential
sources of error leading to outliers. Outliers may have resulted
from misreported or misrecorded data, or they may have occurred when study participants received a large one-time cash
allotment, such as a retroactive SSI benefit or an inheritance.
If income reported was more than four standard deviations
above the mean, then the observation was considered eligible
for winsorizing. This applied to 13 income data. Winsorizing
the outliers was done by replacing the outlier with the next adjacent order statistic (Huber, 2002). For example, if a study participant reported $10,000 of monthly income from SSI and the
next highest reported monthly SSI income value for that study
participant was $850, $850 was substituted for $10,000. Study
participants that indicated receiving a specific source of income
but either refused to provide an amount or did not know how
much they had received were assigned mean values.
Results
Differentiating study participants by primary income
group revealed some demographic differences within the
study sample (see Table 1). Study participants that requalified
for SSI benefits under another disability category were significantly older than the rest of the study sample. Study participants that lost SSI benefits and relied on some other type of
public assistance tended to be female and African American.
Former SSI DA&A beneficiaries residing in Alameda County
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and San Francisco County were more likely have received
public assistance (i.e., SSI, TANF, or GA) following the policy
change, while study participants from San Joaquin County
were more likely to have fallen into the no public assistance
group. In comparison to the other three counties, San Joaquin
County would be considered less urban and more agricultural.
There was no difference in educational level between the three
groups.
Table 1. Baseline Demographic Information by Primary Income
Group.
Retained
SSpublic

n =193
Male (585
Age (years) (SD)***
Ethnicity (0)
African American**
Caucasian
Hispanic
Other
County of residence (%)
Alameda***
San Francisco***
San Joaquin***
Santa Clara
High school graduate (%)

Other

No public
assistance

assistance
n- 87

45.1 (8.42)

43,7
41.3 (7.67)

621
41.5 (8.08)

43.8
32.8
17.2
6.3

52.9
195
17.2
10.3

32.6
28.8
20.2
12.1

32.1
37.8
18.1
11.9
53.4

39.1
24.1
27.6
9.2
54.0

17.4
15.2
53.8
13.6
60.6

Comparisons made using one-way ANOVA and Pearson's chi-square tests.
p < 0,05; **p < 0,01: ***p < 0,001.

Table 2 displays the results of five multilevel growth curve
models for estimating total income following termination of
the DA&A category. The first model indicates that the mean
income for all study participants up to 3.5 years following the
policy change was $652.62, over $100 less than the average
income prior to losing SSI DA&A benefits ($766.54; data not
shown). The second model adds a fixed effect for time and a
random effect for individual differences in the change of total
income over time. From this model, the estimated increase of a
study participant's income was approximately $0.11/day over
the course of the study, when not controlling for any other variables. After 3.5 years, this would equate into an average total
income of approximately $724 for this study sample. When
a study participant's baseline income and primary source of
income following the policy change are added to the model

238

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

(Model 3), we find a significant decrease in the total income
of former DA&A beneficiaries that were unable to retain or
requalify for SSI benefits. When compared to SSI retainers,
study participants that lost SSI benefits averaged over $236
less in total income following the policy change, adjusting
for baseline income and the number of days since the initial
interview.
Model 4 adds demographic, mental health, and substance
abuse covariates to the model. Not surprisingly, having a
high school degree or its equivalent was positively related to
income; however, increases in age and being male were associated with lower income. Residents of Alameda County and
San Joaquin County experienced significantly less income than
residents of San Francisco. This model also indicates that study
participants from the Other ethnicity category earned significantly less income, as well as study participants reporting any
serious mental health symptomatology, when adjusting for
other covariates.
The final model adds employment and a cross-level interaction examining the effect of employment on individual differences in the time slope. This full model includes interaction
coefficients for working 20 hours or less, working more than 20
hours per week, and time since initial interview. Other models
(not shown here) tested the other interactions between employment, primary income group, any mental health symptom,
any illicit drug use, heavy alcohol use, and time since initial
interview; only the interaction representing working more
than 20 hours per week and time since initial interview had a
significant effect on the time slope. These results indicate that
study participants who worked more than 20 hours per week
had a significantly higher rate of income change over time,
while study participants that were unable to achieve substantial rates of hourly employment experienced no change in their
total monthly income over time.
Discussion
The primary function of any welfare state is to ensure the
economic security and basic material sufficiency of its citizens
(Gilbert & Terrell, 2006). Findings from this study indicate that
reforms to the Supplemental Security Income program
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Table 2.

.§

income Growth
Models.

8_

Fixed Effects (SE)
652.62
(8.04).

Intercept
Time since initial
interview (days)

583.85
(12.60)-.
0.11
(0.02)***

Baseline income
Other public
assistance group
No public assistance
group

443.57
(3240)-.
0.11
(0.02)***
0.35
(0.05)"
-236.55
(18.63)***
-236.08
(2812)*

Age (years)
Male
High school graduate
Arican American
Hispanic
Other ethnicitx

756.49
(72.85)".
0,03
(0.02)
0.26
(0.04).
-278.32
(16.77) *
-355.86
(22.05)*
-3.75
(0.98).
-47.40
(14.73)**
40.59
(14.59)**

-8.96
(21.72)
-24.29
(27.81)

0.53
(19.82)
-24.35
(23.56)

-76.31

-36.18
(28.61)
-52.54
(17.43)**

Otethiiy(30.17)*
-66.90

Alameda (ountv AlaedaCouty(21.63)**
San Joaquin Count
anta Clara Co

unta

-53.02
anoaunCut(20.84)*
-4.02
araounty(32.46)

Any mental health

-85.34
(29.96)**
35.55
(26.92)
-12.88
(29.03)

svmptom
Any illicit drug use
Heav

852.38
(78.57)***
0.12
(0.02)***
0.31
(0.04)***
-246.74
(15.89)***
-240.25
(24 83)*
-6.27
(1.24)***
-60.79
(17.59)***
64.76
(14.96)***

alcohol rse

Worked <20 hours

-43.18
(24.22)
-24.04
(29.03)
-39.12
(23.62)
35.51
(24.76)
0.99
(20.45)
193.33
(48.01)***

370.28

Worked > 20 hours

(10747)***
0.02
(0.10)
0.41
(0.12) .

Worked < 20 hours b
time interaction
Worked > 20 hours by
time interaction
Random Effects (SE)

265.15
260.90
225.86
(27,75)***
(24,17)***
(23.28)***
0.22
0.31
0.31
0
Random time slope
Radoteslpe(0.04)***
(0.04)***
(0.03)***
(0.02).
-0.29
-0.30
-0.37
-0.56
(0.09)-(0.10)-(0.09)-(0.11)"
340.30
306.03
306.16
305.56
291.80
Within-person
(13.17)***
(28.34)***
(18.77)***
(26.04)***
(22.87)
p< 0.05; **p <0.01; ***p< 0.001. Reference groups: Retained SSI (primary income group),
San Francisco (county), and Caucasian (ethnicity), and No work (employment).
Between-person

314.92
(14.98)***

317.10
(29.01)***
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that eliminated income and health care benefits to low-income
substance abusers actually compromised the economic security of some of America's most vulnerable and disadvantaged
citizens. While some former SSI DA&A beneficiaries were able
to attain substantial gainful employment (36.5% of our study
sample that failed to requalify for SSI benefits reported working
20 hours or more per week at some point following the policy
change; the average income for these study participants was
approximately $1145 per month at the 42-month follow-up),
many study participants (49.3%) reported never experiencing
any employment following their loss of federal income maintenance benefits. The average total monthly income of study
participants that lost their formal cash assistance and did not
experience any employment up to 3.5 years following the policy
change was only $379 (42-month follow-up; data not shown).
Expectations by policymakers that former SSI DA&A beneficiaries that did not requalify for SSI benefits under another disability category would find employment and achieve a subsistent level of self-sufficiency were only partially realized. For
a significant proportion of this population, the policy change
was associated with reduced income and increased economic
hardship.
Study participants that did requalify for SSI benefits under
another disability category were able to recoup over 93% of
their baseline income 3.5 years following the policy change,
adjusting for inflation. For study participants that lost benefits
and could not requalify for SSI benefits, income recuperation
following elimination of the DA&A category was significantly
more difficult. The group of study participants that relied on
some other type of public assistance was the most severely affected, losing nearly 22% of their immediate economic security.
The rationale that most former SSI DA&A beneficiaries would
requalify for SSI benefits under another disability and carry
on with their lives uninterrupted was neither prudent nor realistic. In the current study, nearly 40% of study participants
that did not requalify for SSI benefits ended up relying on
some other form of public assistance as their primary source of
income following the policy change. Policymakers should be
concerned that eliminating an eligibility category in a federal
public assistance program simply resulted in a significant proportion of former beneficiaries shifting to less economically
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substantial forms of state and local public assistance (i.e.,
TANF and GA). This also led to increased involvement among
informal mechanisms of care, such as family, friends, and communities, requiring these groups to absorb much of the responsibility and burden of providing economic support to former
public assistance recipients. From this perspective, the policy
change fell short of meeting many of its original goals.
Speculation that substance abuse among former SSI DA&A
beneficiaries would have a negative effect on their ability to
achieve self-sufficiency following the policy change was not
supported by statistical evidence. For this study sample,
alcohol and drug use did not have a significant effect on level of
post-policy-change income. Surprisingly, this was also true for
individuals reporting serious mental health symptoms. From
previous research, we know a substantial proportion of former
SSI DA&A beneficiaries that did not requalify for SSI benefits
continued to suffer serious mental health issues following the
policy change (Hogan, Speiglman, & Norris, 2007; Watkins, et
al., 2001). It is interesting that in the current study our mental
health indicator was not a significant predictor of income following the policy change. The fact that individual characteristics, such as alcohol and drug use and mental illness, did not
have a significant effect on post-policy-change levels of income
may alert researchers to examine more systemic or structural influences on the income maintenance of former welfare
recipients, such as access to transportation and available child
care services. This is an area for future research.
There were limitations to this study. The initial quasi-experimental research design limits our confidence to state that
the policy change was the cause of the reduction in income
for study participants that lost SSI benefits. Another important limitation of this study relates to measurement reliability and validity. Measures of income and employment were
based on self-reports. The inaccurate reporting of these variables by study participants could have critical implications for
this study. There were also limitations to the study's sampling
method and external validity. The study sample was limited
by the sampling frame provided by Maximus, the referral and
monitoring agency responsible for tracking SSI DA&A beneficiaries in Northern California. SSI DA&A recipients not known
to Maximus were unavailable for selection. This undoubtedly
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resulted in selection bias. Finally, results from this study cannot
be generalized to all former SSI DA&A beneficiaries. Northern
California has regional variations that may have affected outcomes for this population. For example, during the time of this
study, the economy in Northern California was very good, possibly allowing for better income and employment outcomes
among study participants.
Conclusion
Social welfare policy reforms of the mid 1990s were intended
to reduce the number of Americans receiving public assistance
by promoting personal responsibility and self-sufficiency.
During this movement, politicians attempted to cleanse the
welfare rolls of "undeserving" recipients and replace assumed
welfare dependence with work. By eliminating the SSI DA&A
category, politicians theorized that low-income individuals
with a legitimate physical or mental health disability would
retain their public assistance benefits through the SSI requalification process, and low-income substance abusers would be
expelled from the public dole and forced to find alternative
sources of income, ideally employment. Whether you philosophically agree with this method of welfare reform is not the
current issue; what is important is to understand the effect such
policymaking decisions have on social welfare beneficiaries.
Proponents of the policy change estimated that 75% of
former SSI DA&A beneficiaries would requalify for SSI benefits under another disability category. When only 35% of this
population retained their SSI benefits, policymakers should
have realized that the social welfare of some of our society's
most vulnerable members had been compromised-a result
that is antithetical to the goals and objectives of a progressive
welfare state and a healthy society.
Some former SSI DA&A beneficiaries were able to find
employment and achieve self-sufficiency; however, a substantial proportion was left to suffer increased hardship. When
making policy changes that affect marginalized and disadvantaged populations, policymakers should expect some negative
consequences. If policymakers are purposefully going to cut a
hole in the "safety net" of this country's social welfare system,
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they must have contingencies for the poor and disabled that
fall through it.
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